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I.

Speech Rights of Faculty Members and Other Employees in the Public Sector
For many years the Supreme Court has considered the free speech claims of public
employees under what has become known as the Pickering-Connick balancing test. Under this
test, the Court first asks whether the employee is speaking “as a citizen on a matter of public
concern,” a necessary prerequisite to receiving First Amendment protection for his speech.
Second, the Court weighs the employee’s interest in speaking against the government’s interest
in maintaining an efficient workplace; if the Court finds the speech not disruptive and important
to the public, the employee will win his free speech claim.
But in 2006, the Supreme Court created a categorical exception to the Pickering-Connick
test, concluding that when public employees speak “pursuant to their official duties,” they are not
speaking as private citizens and therefore do not have First Amendment rights, such that the
Constitution “does not insulate their communications from employee discipline.” Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). The majority in Garcetti reserved the question of speech in the
academic context, however, noting that “there is some argument that expression related to
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that
are not fully accounted for” by the Court’s decision. The Court indicated that it therefore was
not deciding whether its “official duties” analysis would apply “in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.” Id. at 425. Nevertheless, it continues to be
the case that many courts faced with First Amendment claims by faculty members at public

1

This outline is an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of higher education cases of interest to this audience that have
come out over approximately the past twelve months. It is intended to provide general information, not binding
legal guidance. If you have a legal inquiry, you should consult an attorney in your state who can advise you on your
specific situation.

1
Published by The Keep, 2011

1

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 25

colleges and universities apply Garcetti as though the Supreme Court had never expressed that
reservation.
We start this presentation by reviewing cases that have invoked Garcetti in the higher
education context over the last year. We also include some cases arising in the K-12 context and
in non-education-related public employment, where those cases indicate the direction of the
courts on speech issues.
A. In-Class Speech Related to Scholarship and Promotions
1. Adams v. University of North Carolina-Wilmington, 7:07-cv-00064-H (E.D.N.C.
2010)
In this complex case, currently on appeal, a federal trial court in North Carolina
suggested that materials in a promotion packet would not be protected by the First Amendment
after Garcetti.
Michael Adams was a tenured associate professor in criminology at the University of
North Carolina-Wilmington. According to Adams, at the time he started at UNC-Wilmington (in
1993) he was an atheist with liberal political beliefs. During this time, he won multiple teaching
and scholarship awards, with peer faculty members calling him “outstanding” and a “master,”
“gifted,” “accomplished,” and “natural” teacher. He was also named the Faculty Member of the
Year twice.
In 2000, Adams had a change of heart and became a self-described Christian
conservative. Problems surfaced between Adams and his colleagues when Adams criticized his
colleagues via e-mail for questioning job candidates about their political views and expressing
“anti-religious sentiments during the interview process.” Another faculty member responded
that “[everyone] know[s] our country allows discrimination on the basis of political orientation.”
In 2003, Adams began writing a column for a website on “issues of academic freedom,
constitutional abuses, discrimination, race, gender, homosexual conduct, feminism, Islamic
extremism, and morality.” The column showcased Adams’ conservative religious beliefs, and
the university was flooded with complaints from upset readers, including potential donors.
Various publications by Adams were also critical of other members of the faculty and the
administration at the university.
At the end of July 2006, Adams formally applied for promotion to full professor.
Adams’ department ultimately voted 7-2 against recommending promotion; the chair adopted the
vote and denied Adams’ application for promotion, which ended the process. In a letter to
Adams, the chair said the decision was based upon Adams’ thin record of productivity, his
undistinguished teaching, and his insufficient record of service to the university and the
profession.
2
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Adams filed suit in federal court claiming, among other things, viewpoint discrimination
in violation of his First Amendment rights.2 The court stated at the outset that “federal courts
review university tenure and promotion decisions ‘with great trepidation,’ consistently applying
‘reticence and restraint’ in reviewing such decisions.” The court therefore limited its review to
“deciding only ‘whether the appointment or promotion was denied because of a discriminatory
reason.’”
Adams’ free speech claim rested on his columns, publications, and presentations, many
of which criticized UNC-Wilmington administrators or staff, and others of which addressed
controversial issues and incorporated Adams’ conservative views. Adams either referred to
these materials in his promotion packet or explicitly included them in the packet (the facts are
unclear); in the court’s words, however, his including the materials in his promotion application
(as the court believed he did) “forc[ed] the very people he criticized to make professional
judgments about this speech.”
Citing to Garcetti, the court characterized the inclusion of the materials as an “implicit
acknowledgement that they were expressions made pursuant to his professional duties – that he
was acting as a faculty member when he said them.” The court reasoned that Adams’ “inclusion
of the speech in his application for promotion . . . marked his speech, at least for promotion
purposes, as made pursuant to his official duties” under Garcetti.
The court made no inquiry as to whether these promotion materials would also constitute
the kind of “speech related to scholarship or teaching” that the Garcetti majority indicated might
not be governed by its “official duties” analysis. Indeed, the court went one step further and
seemed to suggest that any materials included in a faculty member’s promotion packet would be
unprotected under Garcetti. Specifically, the court stated that it found “no evidence of other
protected speech (i.e., speech not presented by plaintiff for review as part of his
application) playing any role in the promotion denial” (emphasis added). The court thus
appeared to conflate “protected speech” with any materials not presented for peer review, and
materials presented for peer review with unprotected speech – a truly chilling suggestion for any
faculty member engaging in controversial research or study. The court therefore dismissed
Adams’ claim that his First Amendment rights were violated during the promotion review
process.
Adams has appealed the court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, and the AAUP submitted an amicus brief in the case – in concert with the Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression and the Foundation for Individual Rights
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in Education – urging the Fourth Circuit to recognize an academic freedom exception to
Garcetti.
B. Faculty Speech as Part of University Governance or Committee Service
1. Isenalumhe v. McDuffie, 697 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
In this case, a federal district court in New York relied on the “official duties” holding in
Garcetti to dismiss the First Amendment claims of two faculty members who complained about
the way their department chair was utilizing university governance procedures.
Anthony Isenalumhe and Jean Gumbs are tenured nursing professors at Medgar Evars
College of the City University of New York (CUNY). In 2001, Georgia McDuffie was hired as
an associate professor and chairperson of the Nursing Department. Isenalumhe and Gumbs
opposed McDuffie’s appointment, and began to complain that she was bypassing faculty
committee processes and was biased in her handling of faculty evaluations. They alleged that
McDuffie retaliated against them for these complaints by subjecting them to extra evaluations,
assigning their usual courses to other teachers, and assigning Gumbs to a non-teaching,
administrative position. Isenalumhe and Gumbs filed suit in federal court, alleging that these
actions were in retaliation for their free speech, in violation of the First Amendment.
The court decided that their complaints about committee matters were not protected
speech under Garcetti because the complaints “involved employee, as opposed to citizen,
speech” that was “ ‘part and parcel’ of plaintiffs’ concerns about their ability to properly execute
their duties as faculty members elected to, and serving on, various committees.” In other words,
the court found that acting as members of the various committees was part of Isenalumhe’s and
Gumbs’s “official duties” as faculty members. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ other
complaints were not protected by the First Amendment because they were about personnel
decisions that did not involve matters of public concern; instead, the court said Isenalumhe and
Gumbs “were complaining about matters affecting them, and them alone” and their motivation in
complaining “was plainly to redress personal grievances.”
This approach is very different than the Second Circuit’s decision in Sousa v. Roque, 578
F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussed in last year’s outline), in which the court held that an
employee’s speech motivated by personal grievances might still be on a “matter of public
concern” and therefore protected by the First Amendment.
See also Davenport v. Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25707 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 14, 2011), in which the federal district court ruled, in
the context of allegations by a long-time employee of the university’s department of public
safety, that “allegations of unethical conduct by the chancellor of a public university is a matter
of public concern.”

4
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss6/25
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1263

4

Levinson: Annual Legal Update

2. Savage v. Gee, 716 F. Supp. 2d 709 (S.D. Ohio 2010)
In this case, a federal district court in southern Ohio dismissed the First Amendment
claim of a faculty member, and appeared to take the view that all speech made as a member of a
faculty governance committee would be unprotected under the “official duties” analysis of
Garcetti.
Scott Savage was the head reference librarian at Ohio State University at Mansfield. In
2006, Savage served on a committee choosing a book to assign to all incoming freshman. His
suggestion, The Marketing of Evil – a book that the Ohio district court found contained “a
chapter discussing homosexuality as aberrant human behavior that has gained general acceptance
under the guise of political correctness” – led to considerable controversy among campus faculty.
Several gay faculty members filed sexual harassment complaints with the university against
Savage, and Savage filed his own complaints of harassment against several faculty members.
After the university rejected both sides’ charges, Savage resigned and then sued, claiming he had
been retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment.
The court held that Savage’s book recommendation was made “pursuant to his official
duties” in serving on the committee, and therefore was not protected speech under Garcetti. The
court decided that “it [made] no difference that [Savage] was not strictly required to serve on the
committee.” Although noting that several other decisions from the same district court had
recognized Garcetti’s academic freedom reservation, the court held that Savage’s speech did not
fall within this category: “The recommendation was made pursuant to an assignment to a faculty
committee… [and], without exceptional circumstances, such activities cannot be classified as
‘scholarship or teaching.’”
3. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007); 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
23504 (9th Cir. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) (unpublished)
This case has been reviewed in prior outlines; it is mentioned again here because a
federal appeals court recently ruled on Dr. Hong’s appeal.
In brief, a federal trial court in California ruled that where a faculty member in the
engineering department at the University of California-Irvine (UCI) made critical comments
about various hiring and promotion decisions – simply as part of his role as a tenured faculty
member, not as a member of an official faculty committee – his speech was not protected,
because of the University of California system’s robust system of shared governance, which
invites “expansive faculty involvement in the interworkings of the University.” As the court
went on to say, “UCI ‘commissioned’ Mr. Hong’s involvement in the peer review process and
his participation is therefore part of his official duties as a faculty member. The University is
free to regulate statements made in the course of that process without judicial interference.”
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The court also found that Dr. Hong’s criticism of his department’s use of lecturers was
unprotected, characterizing the speech as addressing “only . . . internal departmental staffing and
administration.” The court held broadly that “UCI is entitled to unfettered discretion when it
restricts statements an employee makes on the job and according to his professional
responsibilities.”
Finally, the court ruled that Dr. Hong’s comments did not implicate matters of public
concern under the First Amendment. “Each of Mr. Hong’s statements – regarding faculty
performance reviews, departmental staffing and faculty hiring – involved only the internal
personnel decisions of his department. In no way did they implicate matters of pressing public
concern such as malfeasance, corruption or fraud.” The court therefore ruled in favor of the
university.
Dr. Hong subsequently appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. (The AAUP, along with the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression, filed an amicus brief in support of his appeal, asserting that the lower court badly
misconstrued the application of Garcetti to cases involving academic-related speech.) In
November 2010, the appeals court issued a brief, unpublished decision. With respect to the First
Amendment issues, the court decided to “leave the question of whether faculty speech such as
Hong’s is protected under the First Amendment for consideration in another case.” The decision
therefore suggested that the district court’s reasoning, while not overturned, would not
necessarily prevail in a subsequent similar case.
4. Capeheart v. Hahs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14363 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2011)
In this case, a federal district judge in Illinois ruled that when a faculty member speaks in
her role as a student adviser, her speech is pursuant to her “official duties” and is therefore
unprotected under Garcetti.
Loretta Capeheart was a faculty member in the Department of Justice Studies at
Northeastern Illinois University, where she taught and researched social inequality and social
change, particularly in the context of Latino incarceration. She served on the Faculty Council for
Student Affairs (FCSA), was a faculty advisor to the Student Socialist Club, and was vice-chair
of the Faculty Senate. Capeheart was vocal about various issues on campus, often in concert
with students protesting the same issues.
After Capeheart was denied the chair of the Justice Studies Department even though her
colleagues had elected her, was denied appointment as department coordinator, and was denied a
Faculty Excellence Award for a book (though she received the award the following year), she
filed suit against the university, alleging that these actions were retaliation in violation of her
First Amendment rights.
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Specifically, Capeheart said she was retaliated against for three incidents: (1) her
participation with two students, including a member of the Socialist Club, in a protest over
military recruiting on campus; (2) her comments during a meeting of the Illinois Latino caucus
about the university’s failure to attract more Latino students and faculty; and (3) her criticism of
the university’s use of campus police to arrest peacefully protesting students, including members
of the Socialist Club.
The court ruled that “the speech at issue was made pursuant to Capeheart’s professional
responsibilities. . . . Her involvement in protests over recruiting and her advocacy on behalf of
student protesters were part of her role as advisor to the Socialist Club.” The court did note that
Capeheart had argued that her speech should be protected “because Garcetti does not apply to
teachers at public universities,” but the court disposed of that argument in one sentence, saying
that “since Garcetti, courts have routinely held that even the speech of faculty members of public
universities is not protected when made pursuant to their professional duties.” The court
therefore concluded that “Capeheart’s speech regarding military and CIA recruiting on campus
and the university’s treatment of student protesters is not protected under the First Amendment.”
With respect to her criticism of the university’s failure to hire more Latino faculty
members, the court concluded that that speech was not pursuant to her professional
responsibilities. As the judge said, “the defendants have presented no evidence that Capeheart
had any responsibilities to oversee or advise on hiring Latino faculty. Although her job required
her to conduct research, her research involved the social inequalities faced by Latino inmates, not
Latino faculty members.” Capeheart lost on that issue as well, however; since that speech
occurred nearly a year before the supposed retaliation, the court did not believe it was a cause of
the retaliation.
Capeheart intends to appeal the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
C. Speech Related to Employment or Administrative Matters
1. Ezuma v. City Univ. of New York, 367 Fed. Appx. 178 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2010)
(unpublished)
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that a faculty
department chair was not protected by the First Amendment when he relayed a subordinate’s
accusations of sexual harassment to the university administration.
Chukwumeziri Ezuma was a professor and Chair of the Department of Accounting,
Economics, and Finance at the City University of New York (CUNY). While he was chair,
Evelyn Maggio, a faculty member in his department, reported that another faculty member, Dr.
Emmanuel Egbe, was sexually harassing her. Ezuma relayed the complaints to administration
officials; after Maggio sued Egbe and CUNY, Ezuma also recounted Maggio’s accusations to
7
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lawyers and police investigating the complaints. Ezuma was then removed from various
academic committees and as department chair, to which Egbe was appointed in his stead. Ezuma
sued, claiming that these actions were unconstitutional retaliation for his speech about the sexual
harassment.
The Second Circuit ruled that Ezuma’s speech, including his discussions with lawyers
and the police, was “pursuant to his official duties” because, as department chair, he was obliged
to report accusations of sexual harassment. Therefore, the court held, the speech was not
protected under Garcetti. Although noting that Garcetti had exempted speech concerning
“academic scholarship or classroom instruction,” the court decided that this case had “nothing to
do with academic freedom or a challenged suppression of unpopular ideas… The speech at issue
here could have occurred just as easily in a private office, or on a loading dock.”
2. Fox v. Traverse City Area Public Schools Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2010)
In this K-12 education case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed a
teacher’s First Amendment claim and took a broad view of what speech “owes its existence to” a
teacher’s professional responsibilities under Garcetti.
Susan Fox was a Michigan elementary school special-education teacher who complained
to her supervisors that her teaching load exceeded the legal limit. In 2007 the school decided not
to renew her probationary teaching contract, citing her failure to complete required student
Medicaid reports on time, her unauthorized delegation of responsibilities to teaching assistants,
and her failure to provide the minimum required instructional time to students. Fox sued,
claiming the non-renewal was retaliation for her speech in violation of the First Amendment.
The Sixth Circuit held that Fox’s complaints were not protected speech under Garcetti,
noting that “speech by a public employee made pursuant to ad hoc or de facto duties not
appearing in any written job description is nevertheless not protected if it ‘owes its existence to
[the speaker’s] professional responsibilities.’” It determined that Fox’s complaints about class
size “owe[d] [their] existence to” her teaching responsibilities and were therefore not protected.
The court also relied on the fact that Fox’s complaints were directed solely to her supervisor,
rather than the general public, thereby distinguishing other cases where plaintiffs had made
complaints “outside the ordinary chain of command.”
3. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 680 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Maine 2010)
In another non-higher-education related case, a federal district court in Maine took a
similarly broad view of a teacher’s “official duties” for the purposes of the Garcetti analysis.
Ellen Decotiis is a speech language therapist who taught disabled children for Maine’s
Child Development Services (CDS) agency. In 2008, the Maine legislature passed a rule that
summer teaching services would be available only to those students for whom it was “necessary
8
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to comply with federal law.” Because one CDS office for which Decotiis worked provided no
information about how students would be chosen to receive summer teaching services, Decotiis
urged her students’ parents to contact advocacy groups for the disabled to determine “their rights
under state and federal laws,” posting contact information for these groups in her office. The
director of the local CDS office complained that Decotiis was “out to get her,” and a few months
later Decotiis’s annual contract was not renewed. Decotiis sued, alleging that she had been
illegally retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment.
The court dismissed Decotiis’s First Amendment claim, holding that her speech was
“pursuant to her official duties” under Garcetti. The court reasoned that “providing therapy”
was Decotiis’s official duty, and the speech at issue was sufficiently related to that duty because
it involved whether her students would be receiving therapy, it occurred during Decotiis’s
therapy sessions, and it was directed only to parents of her students (rather than the general
public). Further, the court decided that the speech was “influenced and informed by her position
as a therapist” because she had asked her superiors about the summer teaching policy.
D. Faculty Speech on Curriculum and Student Discipline
1. Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education of Tipp City Exempted Village School
District, 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010)
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the termination of a
high-school English teacher who claimed her employment was unconstitutionally terminated
by an Ohio school district in retaliation for her choice of student reading selections (including
Herman Hesse’s Siddhartha) and teaching methods – ironically enough, when teaching a unit
on government censorship and banned books. In so doing, the Court ruled that First
Amendment retaliation cases arising in the employment context require a three-part analysis –
under Connick (for the matter of public concern inquiry), Pickering (for the balancing
requirement), and Garcetti (for the “pursuant to official duties” analysis) – and that “a First
Amendment claimant must satisfy each of these requirements.”
The court found that “Garcetti’s caveat offers no refuge” where the teacher is at the
secondary level rather than at a public college or university. As the court explained, “As a
cultural and a legal principle, academic freedom ‘was conceived and implemented in the
university’ out of concern for ‘teachers who are also researchers or scholars – work not
generally expected of elementary and secondary school teachers’” (quoting J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 288
n.137 (1989).) The court also opined – though in non-binding dicta, since the issue before it
did not actually relate to university-level faculty – that academic freedom belongs to the
university rather than to the individual professor.
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E. Extramural Speech
1. Whitfield v. Chartiers Valley School Dist., 707 F. Supp. 2d 561 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
In this case, a federal district court in western Pennsylvania held that a school
administrator’s testimony at a teacher disciplinary hearing was protected by the First
Amendment.
Tammy Whitfield was an assistant superintendent in the Pennsylvania Chartiers Valley
School District who testified at the disciplinary hearing of a teacher in the district. Two board
members attended the hearing and loudly expressed their disapproval of her testimony. After the
board failed to renew her 5-year contract, Whitfield filed suit alleging that she had been
retaliated against for her testimony, in violation of her free speech rights.
The defendants argued that Whitfield’s speech was not protected under Garcetti, but the
court applied Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008), in which the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a public employee’s courtroom testimony was
protected by the First Amendment even after Garcetti. The court distinguished Garcetti on the
grounds that the school board had no right to control the content or manner of Whitfield’s
testimony. Indeed, such control would violate the due process rights of Whitfield and the teacher
being investigated, said the court. Then the court applied the Pickering-Connick test to
Whitfield’s speech, finding that: (1) her testimony was a matter of public concern both because
of its setting in front of an official government adjudicatory body and because it was a local
controversy that divided public opinion and prompted several newspaper articles; and (2) the
balancing of interests favored Whitfield because the defendants failed to show that her testimony
damaged any government interest in efficiency or effectiveness.
F. Union- or Organization-Related Speech
1. Petrich v. City of Flint, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137231 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2010)
Speer v. City of Flint, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137228 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2010)
In these two related cases decided on the same day, a federal district court in Michigan
ruled that the Garcetti “official duties” analysis does not apply when public employees speak on
a matter of public concern on behalf of a union or another organization, rather than in their
capacity as public employees.
In Petrich, a police officer for the City of Flint, Michigan, was also the president of the
Flint branch of the African-American Police League (AAPL). After a new acting police chief
was appointed, Officer Petrich strongly criticized the appointment in a local newspaper interview
in which he was identified as the president of the AAPL. He was then disciplined under a new
policy preventing police officers from speaking to the media without prior permission. He sued,
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claiming that the policy was unconstitutional and that the city had violated his First Amendment
free speech rights.
The court first ruled that Officer Petrich had spoken on a matter of public concern; in the
court’s view, “public safety concerns require a well-run police force, and [Petrich] expressed his
view that this expectation would not be met under [the acting chief’s] leadership. Nothing in
[Petrich’s] comment indicates a purely personal vendetta . . . .” The court also ruled that
Garcetti did not strip Officer Petrich’s speech of protection: because the City of Flint had “no
interest in controlling the speech of the AAPL” where Officer Petrich “spoke to the media in his
capacity as president of the AAPL, rather than as a police officer, Garcetti does not bar his First
Amendment claims.”
Finally, the court ruled that the City failed to show that Officer Petrich’s comments
interfered with the operations of the police department or caused disharmony among his coworkers. The AAPL’s interest in expressing its views was therefore greater than the City’s in
maintaining police discipline. As the court further noted, “Plaintiff’s statements as head of the
AAPL do not undermine the authority of the police chief. Although the AAPL’s views may
conflict with Defendant’s, this does not constitute insubordination.” The court did emphasize
that Officer Petrich was authorized to speak on behalf of the AAPL, and suggested that that was
a critical element of its decision.
Speer also involved a police officer for the City of Flint, who was president of the Flint
Police Officers’ Association (FPOA), the police officers’ union. Officer Speer spoke to the
media – as he had frequently done in the past in his capacity as union president – about his
dissatisfaction with the appointment of the new acting police chief. Pursuant to the new media
policy, he was disciplined, and he sued, alleging that his First Amendment rights had been
violated.
The court first concluded that Speer’s speech was on a matter of public concern,
observing that “Flint residents have a strong interest in the correct operation of the Flint Police
Department because of its central role in maintaining public safety. They therefore have an
interest in Defendant’s attempts to silence the police union.” The court also noted that Speer’s
comments were “particularly relevant to outsiders, as they would be most affected by
Defendant’s decision to restrict statements to the media.”
The court next ruled that Speer’s speech remained protected after Garcetti. As the court
reasoned, quoting Garcetti, “the City’s interest in ‘controlling speech’ and ensuring ‘substantive
consistency’ is considerably reduced in connection with the speech of a union official, due to the
inherent tension between the union and the administration. The collective bargaining system
envisions a dynamic between employer and union [that] is unlike the relationship between
employer and employee; this includes the expression of sometimes conflicting opinions. An
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employer cannot expect to control the union’s speech in the same way it would control an
employee’s.”
Finally, the court ruled that Speer’s speech did not interfere with the performance of his
duties or cause disharmony among his coworkers. As the court drily noted, “given the actions
taken just prior to Plaintiff’s discipline, such as closing the jail and laying off police officers,
some discord between the police officers’ union and the administration could be expected.”
Because the City did not exercise authority over Speer when he spoke as the president of the
FPOA, his statements on behalf of the FPOA did not undermine the police chief’s authority. As
the court put it, “although the union’s views may conflict with Defendant’s, this does not
constitute insubordination.”
G. Other First Amendment Issues (Not Garcetti-Related)
1. Rodriguez v. Maricopa County Community College District, 605 F.3d 703 (9th Cir.
2010)
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a professor’s use of
his college’s e-mail system was protected by the First Amendment. The court also held that the
professor’s college could not be liable under Title VII – a federal anti-discrimination statute – for
failing to discipline him for his speech.
Professor Walter Kehowski, a math teacher in the Maricopa County Community College
District, sent several e-mails to all district employees in which he criticized the district’s
endorsement of Dia de la Raza (a holiday that some Hispanics celebrate instead of Columbus
Day) and linked to articles that argued for the “superiority of Western Civilization.” After the emails caused protests on campus and in the wider community, the president of the college and
the chancellor of the district condemned Kehowski’s e-mails. But they refused to sanction him,
stating that doing so “could seriously undermine our ability to promote true academic freedom.”
Hispanic employees of the district sued, claiming that the district’s failure to discipline
Kehowski led to a hostile work environment, violating the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
The Ninth Circuit held that Kehowski’s e-mails were not harassment because they were
not directed at one person, but instead were the “effective equivalent of standing on a soap box in
a campus quadrangle and speaking to all within earshot.” The court reasoned that the
government could not silence such public speech based on the viewpoint of the speech, which
was what the plaintiffs were arguing the district should have done. The court declared:
The right to provoke, offend and shock lies at the core of the First Amendment.
This is particularly so on college campuses. Intellectual advancement has
traditionally progressed through discord and dissent, as a diversity of views
ensures that ideas survive because they are correct, not because they are popular.
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Colleges and universities – sheltered from the currents of popular opinion by
tradition, geography, tenure, and monetary endowments – have historically
fostered that exchange. But that role in our society will not survive if certain
points of view may be declared beyond the pale.
The court also afforded substantial deference to the college’s decision not to
discipline Kehowski because “[t]he academy’s freedom to make such decisions without
excessive judicial oversight is an essential part of academic liberty and a special concern of the
First Amendment.”
2. Depree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2009)
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit partially dismissed a
professor’s free speech and retaliation claims because it found that his First Amendment rights
were not “clearly established” at the time that the university administrators he was suing
supposedly retaliated against him.
Chauncey DePree was a tenured professor in the University of Southern Mississippi
(USM) business school. In August 2007, the dean of DePree’s college sent a letter to Martha
Saunders, the USM president, complaining that DePree was acting in a negative and disruptive
manner and creating “an environment in which faculty members and students do not feel safe to
go about their usual business.” The letter also maintained that DePree was the only faculty
member in his department that USM’s accrediting agency had failed to find academically or
professionally qualified. Enclosed with the dean’s letter were eight other letters from professors
complaining of DePree’s behavior.
President Saunders referred the complaints to the university provost for further
investigation. In the meantime, she relieved DePree of his teaching functions and told him to stay
out of the business school, except to retrieve personal items. However, he was instructed to
continue his research activities, and was allowed uninterrupted access to the USM computer
system and library. His salary and benefits remained the same.
Soon after, DePree sued the president, the dean, and other administrators in both their
personal and official capacities, alleging that they had retaliated against him in violation of the
First Amendment. He claimed that the suspension of his teaching duties was retaliation for his
website, on which he criticized USM, and for his complaints to USM’s accrediting agency about
the school. He also alleged that USM had denied him due process rights guaranteed by the
constitution and violated certain state laws. A federal district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment, and DePree appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
On DePree’s First Amendment claim, the Fifth Circuit ruled that at the time that
Saunders disciplined DePree, it was not clear in the Fifth Circuit whether Saunders’ removal of
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DePree’s teaching duties would “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of retaliation.” Under rules of qualified immunity for governmental officials, Saunders
therefore could not be held liable in her personal capacity.
The court also held that the other administrators could not be liable in their personal
capacities because only final decision-makers – in this case, Saunders – can be held liable for
First Amendment retaliation in employment. However, determining that DePree might have a
valid claim against USM administrators in their official capacities, the court sent those claims
back to district court for further fact-finding.
Interestingly, USM appears not to have argued that DePree’s speech was “pursuant to his
official duties” under Garcetti v. Ceballos. In a footnote, the court observed: “Whether DePree's
speech would receive protection following Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, is not clear on the
incomplete record before us, but we do not go behind the parties’ current positions.”
On DePree’s Due Process claim, the Fifth Circuit found no violation because DePree had
no “unique property interest in teaching.” Finding DePree’s “reliance on the faculty
handbook…inapposite,” the court compared Saunders’ removal of DePree’s teaching duties to a
reassignment or transfer, actions that would implicate no property interest “absent a specific
statutory provision or contract term to the contrary.”
3. Knudsen v. Washington State Executive Ethics Board, 156 Wn. App. 852 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2010)
In this case, a Washington state appeals court held that a professor had violated a state
ethics law when she used her school e-mail for political purposes.
Teresa Knudsen was a part-time adjunct academic advisor at Spokane Community
College (SCC) who taught classes in the English Department. In February 2005, Knudsen sent
an e-mail from her SCC computer to all SCC faculty, asking them to encourage Washington state
legislators to approve two bills that would provide tenure-like protections for part-time faculty.
The e-mail provided legislators’ e-mail address, a sample letter that the recipients could send,
and tips about how to best influence the legislator, including: “[T]ell any of your personal
problems with lack of job security. You can mention as well that this bill has no cost associated
with it.”
SCC informed Knudsen that her e-mail constituted lobbying unrelated to her official
duties and was therefore illegal under the state ethics in public service act, which forbids state
employees from using state property “for private benefit or gain” of themselves or another. The
Washington State Executive Board (“the Board”) also adopted rules interpreting this statute,
which allowed de minimis private use of state property. The Board heard Knudsen’s case and
agreed that she had violated the act, as did a state trial court. Knudsen appealed her case to the
state court of appeals.
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Knudsen made several arguments invoking her free speech rights and her rights as a
union member. With respect to her rights as a union member, the court rejected her argument
because (1) Knudsen admitted she had sent the e-mail because she thought the union’s lobbyists
were not doing enough to promote the bills and (2) she “failed to establish that she was a union
representative.”
With respect to her free speech rights, the court decided that the school’s internal e-mail
and computer system were “nonpublic forums…because members of the public do not have inperson access to the computers or e-mail accounts.” Because the system was nonpublic, rules
restricting speech through SCC’s e-mail needed only to be “reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”
The court found that the Board’s rules and the state law met this test and thus affirmed the lower
court.
II. Tenure, Due Process, and Breach of Contract
A. Bernold v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, 683 S.E. 2d 428
(N.C. App. 2009)
In this case, a North Carolina state appeals court upheld a university’s decision to fire a
tenured professor based solely on the finding that the professor had rendered “incompetent
service.”
Leonhard Bernold had been a tenured professor at North Carolina State University
(NCSU) since 1996. In 2002, NCSU adopted post-tenure review regulations, which provided that
“unsatisfactory reviews in two consecutive years or any three out of five years ‘will constitute
evidence of the professional incompetence of the individual and may justify… discharge for
cause.’” Bernold received post-tenure review findings of “does not meet expectations” in 2002,
2003, and 2004. He was then discharged for incompetent teaching and incompetent service.
After his discharge, Bernold requested a hearing before the faculty hearing committee.
The committee found unanimously that he was a competent teacher, but found, by a 3 to 2 vote,
that he had provided incompetent service. The university’s Chancellor upheld these findings, but
sent the matter back to the committee for a recommendation on whether to discharge Bernold
based solely on the finding of incompetent service.
After holding an additional hearing on the issue of petitioner’s service, the committee
changed its mind and found, by a 4 to 1 vote, that petitioner was actually “not incompetent in the
area of service.” This time, however, the chancellor reversed the committee’s decision, and
decided to discharge Bernold. Both the university Board of Trustees and the university Board of
Governors affirmed the chancellor’s decision. Bernold sued, but the trial court upheld the
university’s right to discharge him. On appeal, Bernold made three arguments.
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First, Bernold argued that tenured professors have a substantive due process right to
protection from discharge for any reason other than incompetence, misconduct or neglect of
duty. However, the appeals court upheld Bernold’s discharge for incompetence because it found
his three years of unsatisfactory reviews were sufficient evidence of professional incompetence.
The court then noted that the university based its ultimate discharge on “incompetence of
service” which rendered him unfit to continue as a member of the faculty. The school
specifically alleged that “his interactions with colleagues had been so disruptive that the effective
and efficient operation of his department was impaired.” Because a College of Engineering
regulation stated that “each faculty member is expected to work in a collegial manner,” the court
found that his unsatisfactory post-tenure reviews constituted “sufficient evidence of his
professional incompetence to justify his discharge for cause.”
Second, Bernold argued that the university violated his procedural due process rights in
its use of the review process to discharge him. Bernold cited to language from the University
Policy Manual, which states one purpose of post-tenure review process is to “provide for a clear
plan and timetable for improvement of performance of faculty found deficient.” Because the
University did not provide a clear plan or timetable, Bernold alleged that his due process rights
had been violated. However, the court found that the policy manual was not a set of due process
requirements but rather a “list of principles to guide the post-tenure review process.” Whether or
not the University followed the policy manual, it did follow the university regulatory
requirements and thus did not violate Bernold’s due process rights.
Finally, Bernold argued that the trial court erred in finding substantial evidence in the
record to support his discharge for incompetence. However, the court rejected this argument
because of the limited role appellate courts play in assessing evidence. The court noted:
Petitioner relies on his argument that “lack of collegiality” cannot constitute
incompetence; however, he cites no authority that disruptive behavior cannot
constitute incompetence. Petitioner then draws our attention to evidence in the
record showing petitioner’s positive interactions with some colleagues and
explaining the reasons behind his negative interactions with others. Our task is not
to comb the record for evidence that would support a different outcome from that
reached by the Board, but rather to look for substantial evidence to support the
decision. Here there is ample evidence that petitioner was disruptive to this point
that his department’s function and operation were impaired.
B. Sabinson v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 160 N.H. 452 (N.H. 2010)
In this case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld a university’s decision to
reassign a professor’s course offerings because the reassignment did not constitute a “major
change” under university policy.
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Mara Sabinson is a professor in the Dartmouth College Theater Department. In July
2001, disputes within the Theater Department caused the Associate Dean for the Faculty of
Humanities to assume the role of department chair. The Dean reassigned one of Sabinson’s
classes and her directorship of the 2005-2006 main stage production. In May 2005, a faculty
committee concluded that “the Theater Department has suffered grievously from the presence of
Mara Sabinson,” with “faculty and students alike” complaining “of her harsh treatment of
students” and “of her uncollegial behavior in Department meetings” and towards “junior and
adjunct colleagues.” The committee recommended that Dartmouth offer Sabinson a retirement
package and limit her course offerings. After administrators did so, Sabinson filed a grievance,
filed complaints with the EEOC and the New Hampshire Commission on Human Rights, and
eventually filed suit in federal district court, alleging age, gender, and religious discrimination,
retaliation, breach of contract, and wrongful discharge and demotion.
The district court dismissed or granted Dartmouth summary judgment on all claims
except breach of contract, over which it declined to exercise jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, and Sabinson then filed a breach of contract claim in New
Hampshire state court, which also ruled against Sabinson.
On appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Sabinson made several arguments
regarding the contract rights she believed she had in specific course offerings. First, she argued
that her course reassignment constituted a “major change in the conditions of employment”
under Dartmouth’s Agreement Concerning Academic Freedom, Tenure, and Responsibility of
Faculty Members, and that the reassignment therefore should have triggered the disciplinary
procedures outlined in that agreement. The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed,
upholding the trial court’s finding that the reassignment was not “major” because it was neither a
reduction in employment nor in benefits. Assuming (without deciding) that the Agreement was a
contract between Dartmouth and Sabinson, the court relied on the “plain meaning” – that is, the
literal dictionary definitions – of the words “major” and “change.” It also relied on examples of
“major changes” listed in the Agreement, which involved cessation of employment and/or
compensation.
In addition, Sabinson argued that “she had substantive rights to teach her preapproved,
published courses.” The court quickly dismissed this argument because Sabinson had cited no
authority for this proposition. The New Hampshire Supreme Court therefore affirmed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment for Dartmouth College.
C. Haviland v. Brown University, 2010 R.I. Super. LEXIS 30 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 11,
2010)
This case involved a university’s creation of a tenure-like teaching position for the spouse
of an incoming dean. A Rhode Island state court found that a legally enforceable employment
contract existed between the spouse and the university, even though the terms of the contract
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existed only in a series of letters from various university officials (rather than in one cohesive
document).
In the spring of 2000, Brown University asked Paul Armstrong to be the Dean of the
College at Brown. Both Armstrong and his wife Beverly Haviland were tenured professors at
the State University of New York at Stony Brook (SUNY), and Armstrong told Brown that he
would not accept the position unless the university also offered Haviland a tenured teaching
position. Because there were no tenured positions open in Haviland’s specialties, the university
offered Haviland a position combining that of a Senior Lecturer and a Visiting Associate
Professor. Instead of drawing up one cohesive contract, the university offered Haviland the job
and described its scope and benefits through a series of letters.
The first letters, dated October 16 and 18, 2000, stated that Haviland’s appointment
would be renewed every five years except for “adequate cause.” The letters stated that adequate
cause:
shall be understood to be substantially equivalent to adequate cause for dismissal
of a tenured faculty member…which is defined in the Faculty Rules and
Regulations as the following: demonstrated incompetence, dishonesty in teaching
or research, substantial and manifest neglect of duty, or personal conduct which
substantially impairs fulfillment of institutional responsibility.
After these terms were approved by Haviland, Armstrong, and members of the Brown
administration, Armstrong accepted the job as dean. On November 6, 2000, however, Haviland
received a letter from the Dean of Faculty noting that her appointment as Senior Lecturer had
been approved by the Committee on Faculty Reappointment and Tenure, as well as an attached
note that said “this supercedes my letter to you of October 18.” Concerned that the university
was attempting to renege on the initial agreement, Haviland contacted the Dean of Faculty, who
assured her in a letter dated November 17, 2000 that “the use of the term ‘supercedes’ was
unfortunate” and that her appointment was as both a Senior Lecturer and a Visiting Associate
Professor.
In 2004, Haviland was reviewed for reappointment, and a faculty committee
recommended against reappointing her because she had failed to satisfy the department standard
of “sustained excellence in teaching,” a different standard than what had been outlined in the
October letters. She was eventually reappointed to the position, but in 2009 was again reviewed
under the department’s “sustained excellence in teaching” standard. Although her current
appointment lasts through 2015, Haviland thought that her reappointment should have been
governed by the tenure review standards outlined in letters of October 16 and 18. She filed suit
in the Superior Court of Rhode Island asking for a declaratory judgment to define the
enforceability and terms of her employment agreement with Brown.
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Initially, Brown argued that Haviland could not sue because she had not suffered any
legal injury. But the court disagreed, finding that Brown’s “alleged failure to abide by the
promised protections has led to ongoing uncertainty with regard to [Haviland’s] future
employment” and with regard to the standards the university would use in deciding whether to
reappoint her. This uncertainty was sufficient legal injury allowing Haviland to sue, the court
ruled.
The court further ruled that, despite the lack of an “integrated document” defining
Haviland’s employment status, there was a “meeting of the minds on the terms of the offer” and
therefore a valid and enforceable contract. Even if a valid contract had not existed, the court
held that there was an “independent equitable basis for finding the terms of the agreement
enforceable” because Haviland had reasonably relied on the promise of employment when
resigning from her SUNY position and moving her family to Rhode Island.
As to the terms of the contract, the court held that the terms of the October letters were
binding. This meant that Haviland’s appointment must be renewed for additional five-year terms
unless Brown presented her with written proof of adequate cause, defined as “demonstrated
incompetence, dishonesty in teaching or research, substantial and manifest neglect of duty, or
personal conduct which substantially impairs fulfillment of institutional responsibility.” The
court also ruled that Haviland was entitled to the same due process rights as tenured faculty
members.
D. Mills v. Western Washington University, 170 Wn. 2d 903 (Wash. 2011)
In this case, the Washington Supreme Court held that a university did not engage in
unlawful procedure by closing a professor’s disciplinary procedure to the public and that the
state constitution does not apply to university administrative hearings.
Professor Perry Mills, a tenured professor at Western Washington University (WWU),
was suspended without pay for two academic quarters for violating the faculty code of ethics.
The suspension followed a university administrative hearing that was, despite his objections,
closed to the public and press. The Washington Court of Appeals ruled that the university
violated Washington’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by closing the hearing to the public
and reversed the university’s disciplinary order and remanded for a new hearing. In this
decision, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the state court of appeals decision.
The court first concluded that because the WWU faculty handbook was developed under
a delegation of authority from the state legislature to the Board of Trustees, and because a
section of the handbook allowed for closure of the hearing, that section constituted an exception
to the state Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement that hearings otherwise be public.
Professor Mills also argued that even if the closure of his disciplinary hearing was
acceptable under the APA, it was unconstitutional under the Washington State Constitution,
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which states that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary
delay.” The court determined that the authors of the constitution were referring only to courts in
the judicial branch, not to the “quasi-judicial proceedings” of a university administrative hearing.
III.

Faculty and Institutional Authority and Governance
1. Rosenthal v. New York University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95080 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
2010)

In this case a federal district court reinforced the discretion and authority of faculty over
clearly educational matters.
Ayal Rosenthal was a part-time MBA student at NYU’s Stern School of Business. He
also worked for Pricewaterhouse Coopers, and he tipped off his brother to nonpublic securities
information, which his brother used to make trades. The federal government initiated an
investigation upon learning of his activities. Rosenthal pled guilty to conspiracy to commit
securities fraud shortly after completing his Stern course requirements, but before receiving his
degree. The school decided not to grant him his degree, based in part on a recommendation from
the faculty, and Rosenthal sued.
NYU and Rosenthal wrangled over whether the school had provided him with the precise
procedural requirements guaranteed by various handbooks and sets of rules. The court, however,
took a more holistic approach. As the court observed:
As an initial matter, Rosenthal proposes an elaborate jurisdictional and procedural
argument that cherry picks from NYU's various rules and regulations. Defendants
have risen to the bait, framing the case largely in those terms. But this is a
misconception. The University Bylaws expressly confer upon the faculty of each
school the authority to determine “the standards of academic achievement to be
attained for each degree offered” and “to certify to the President, for
recommendation to the Board, qualified candidates for degrees and certificates.”
While the Stern faculty's decision to withhold Rosenthal's degree followed the
form of a disciplinary proceeding, it determined pursuant to its duly-conferred
authority that Rosenthal was not fit to receive a degree on the basis of his
admitted felonious conspiracy to commit securities fraud. That decision was fully
within the faculty’s power and discretion. It was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Thus, Rosenthal's contentions are entirely without merit on that ground alone.
The court went on to examine the University Bylaws, which also appear in the NYU
Faculty Handbook. The NYU Bylaws state:
Subject to the approval of the Board and to general University policy as defined
by the President and the Senate, it is the duty of each faculty to determine . . . the
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standards of academic achievement to be attained for each degree offered, . . . to
make and enforce rules for the guidance and conduct of the students, and to
certify to the President, for recommendation to the Board, qualified candidates for
degrees and certificates.
The Bylaws also state that “[t]he power of suspending or dismissing a student of any
school is lodged with the voting faculty of that school” (as opposed to the University Senate,
which has jurisdiction over “educational matters and regulations of the academic community”).
The court concluded that the Bylaws “grant the Stern faculty exclusive jurisdiction and
authority to determine Stern’s standards of academic achievement, confer degrees, and dismiss
students. The Stern faculty’s decision to withhold Rosenthal’s degree was an exercise of the
authority delegated to it” under the Bylaws.
2. Massachusetts Board of Higher Education/Holyoke Community College v. Massachusetts
Teachers Association/Massachusetts Community College Council/National Education
Association, 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 328 (Mass. Ct. App. March 11, 2011)
In this state court case, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reversed and remanded most
of an arbitrator’s decision regarding reinstatement of a former tenured faculty member, on
grounds of institutional authority over hiring decisions.
Elizabeth Hebert was a former tenured faculty member at Holyoke Community College
who applied for a position at the college that required a master’s degree. When she was not
hired for the position, she filed a grievance with the union on the grounds that she was a
“retrenched” faculty member who was owed certain rights under the collective bargaining
agreement. The arbitrator ruled in her favor and ordered the community college to hire her for
the position and pay her back pay, or to pay her the full salary for the position as long as the
position continued to exist.
The appeals court concluded that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in ordering
Hebert’s reinstatement. As the court observed, “[f]ew issues are as central to setting educational
policy as choosing which faculty members to hire or promote,” and “specific appointment
decisions cannot be delegated to an arbitrator” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although some of the precedent on which the court relied arose in the K-12 context, the court
added:
These principles apply with at least equal force in the context of higher education. The
need for college administrators to be able to exercise judgment in conducting faculty
searches is reinforced by the discretionary nature of evaluating the candidates. Hiring
faculty, like granting tenure, “necessarily hinge[s] on subjective [judgments] regarding
the applicant’s academic excellent, teaching ability, creativity, contributions to the
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university community, rapport with students and colleagues, and other factors that are not
susceptible of quantitative measurement.”
(Quoting Berkowitz v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 269
(Mass. Ct. App. 2003).) Accordingly, the court ruled, even if the scope of a collective
bargaining agreement appears to include a college’s judgment regarding candidates for a faculty
appointment, such matters are not in fact within the authority of an arbitrator.
On a related issue, however, the court sided against the college. The union had alleged
that the person who was hired instead of Hebert did not have a master’s degree and therefore
could not be chosen in her stead. The college argued in response that because the successful
candidate was “ABD,” and therefore had a credential that was equivalent to or greater than a
master’s degree, she was an appropriate hire. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that
“having drafted its posting expressly to require that candidates have a master’s degree, the
college was not free to determine that a candidate who had obtained neither a master’s degree
nor a higher degree nevertheless possessed ‘better’ credentials than one with a master’s degree.”
The arbitrator therefore did have the authority to determine whether the college had, in good
faith, utilized the minimum job requirements that the college itself had established.
Finally, the court held that the arbitrator did not have the authority to reappoint Hebert,
“because it would directly intrude upon the appointment authority left to the exclusive purview
of the college administration.” Because it was not clear that the college wanted to hire Hebert,
but it could not hire its preferred candidate because she did not have a master’s degree, the court
directed the college to begin a new search (if it still wanted to fill the position), “using whichever
criteria the college administration determines best serve the college’s needs.” The court also
remanded the case to the arbitrator to award monetary compensation to Hebert that did not rise to
the level of the “full-scale damages” the arbitrator originally awarded, which exceeded his
authority.
IV. Union/Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues
A. State Labor Laws
1. Fort Hays State University v. FHSU AAUP Chapter, 228 P.3d 403 (Kan. 2010)
In this case, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the state agency enforcing Kansas’s
labor laws had no authority to grant monetary awards for labor law violations.
Frank Gaskill was an associate professor at Fort Hays State University (FHSU), hired on
the tenure track for the 2000-2001 academic year. In May 2001, FHSU informed him that it
would not renew his appointment for the 2001-2002 academic year. At that time, the local
AAUP was the certified bargaining representative for FHSU faculty but had yet to enter into a
memorandum of agreement with FHSU. In 2001, the AAUP filed a prohibited practices
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complaint with the state Public Employee Relations Board (PERB), alleging that FHSU had
violated the Kansas Public Employer-Employee Relations Act (PEERA) by shutting the AAUP
out of Gaskill’s grievance process and unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment
without bargaining in good faith with the AAUP.
Initially a PERB hearing officer found that the university violated PEERA. It ordered the
university to cease and desist, to post notices advising FHSU employees of their rights under
PEERA, and to pay Gaskill – who was not actually a party to the administrative proceeding –
$142,013.62 in damages. The university appealed, and PERB, while affirming that the
university had violated the act, determined that monetary damages were improper in this case.
The AAUP chapter appealed PERB’s decision, and the state trial court reversed PERB’s
conclusion that monetary damages were improper. On remand, PERB reduced Gaskill’s award
to $12,772.80, and also outlined the scope of PERB’s power to award monetary damages under
PEERA: it declared that its power to award monetary damages derived from PEERA’s broad
remedial purpose, but that PERB did not have the power to award punitive damages or anything
resembling a “windfall.” This finding was appealed up through the Kansas state court system
and eventually reached the Kansas Supreme Court.
During the litigation process, PERB and the AAUP chapter argued that although PEERA
did not explicitly grant PERB the power to award monetary damages, this power could be
inferred from: (1) PERB’s quasi-judicial functions and PEERA’s broad purpose; (2) a previous
version of PEERA, which included a broad grant of authority; and (3) analogy to other labor
laws.
The Kansas Supreme Court was not persuaded by those arguments and determined that
PERB does not have the power to grant monetary remedies for PEERA violations. First, the
court found that “any connection between the monetary damages ordered in this case and
PEERA’s statutory purposes to encourage discussion of grievances and improving relationships
is tenuous at best.” The court concluded that a monetary remedy could only serve these purposes
if it were viewed as a punitive remedy, which PERB had conceded it was without authority to
impose.
Second, the court held that the legislature’s decision to change the previous version of
PEERA might have indicated its intent to remove this power from PERB. Even if this was not
the legislature’s intent, the court declared that “the legislature alone must remedy the mistake.”
Finally, the court refused to analogize PEERA to the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) because of the “distinctions between private employment, covered by the NLRA, and
public employment under PEERA.”
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2.

AAUP, Lincoln University Chapter v. Lincoln University, 41 PPER 120 (2010)

The AAUP CB chapter at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania claimed that the university
engaged in an unfair labor practice (ULP) and violated the Public Employee Relations Act by
reprimanding a faculty member who failed to use the required form in submitting information
about his outside activities. The university and the chapter had entered into a settlement
agreement several years earlier giving the university the right to discipline faculty members who
didn’t use a particular form in reporting those activities. Specifically, the agreement stated that
“Lincoln University has the right, within its managerial prerogative, to require all faculty
members to submit an outside remunerative activity form, whether the faculty member has any
activity or not. . . . Lincoln University has the right . . . to discipline faculty members for failure
to submit the form . . . .” A faculty member submitted the required information, but in letter
form, and the university formally reprimanded him.
In considering the ULP charge, the Hearing Examiner for the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board reasoned: “That settlement clearly, and unequivocally, allows Lincoln to
discipline any bargaining unit member who does not use the proper from when reporting outside
remunerative activity to Lincoln. . . . Williams, a bargaining unit member, did not submit the
proper outside-remuneration form; the settlement agreement gives Lincoln the right to discipline
a bargaining unit member who does not submit the proper outside remuneration form. That ends
the analysis.” The Hearing Examiner went on to note: “Williams’ September 8, 2009, letter to
Lincoln does set forth, with specificity, his outside employment . . . . Nevertheless, the Union
agreed that bargaining unit members could be disciplined if they do not file the proper form, and
Williams did not do so. Lincoln, evidently, wants to hold the Union to that specific performance.
If the Union wanted to be able to simply have bargaining unit members write a letter, it could
have bargained that. But, it didn’t.” The Examiner therefore dismissed the charge of unfair
practices in its entirety.
3. University of Oakland v. AAUP, Oakland University Chapter, 23 MPER 86 (2010)
Oakland University in Michigan attempted, as part of a response to a pending grievance,
to renege on a settlement agreement that the university (through the president and vice provost)
and the AAUP chapter had signed a decade earlier. The university’s justification for reneging on
the agreement was that the Board of Trustees had not ratified the agreement, and that it therefore
was not binding.
The Michigan Employment Relations Commission concluded that because the union was
never informed that Board ratification was necessary, and because it was reasonable for the
union to believe that signatures from the president and vice provost were sufficient, the
agreement was valid, and the university’s attempt to renege constituted unlawful repudiation
under the Public Employee Relations Act.
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As the Commission panel stated, “To allow one party to renege on a lawful agreement
would negate the stability and reliability that is the goal of good faith bargaining. It is central to
the stability of labor relations that such agreements be enforced, for if they can be unilaterally
revoked, the stability and the possibility of future good faith bargaining is undermined. . . . For
the stability of labor relations, a party must be able to rely on the apparent authority of those
representatives entering into settlements on behalf of their principal.” (citations omitted). The
panel also concluded that the repudiation was not insubstantial, endorsing the Administrative
Law Judge’s observation that “the issue of compliance with the University constitutional
processes was seen by both parties as sufficiently significant to craft language in the collective
bargaining agreement protecting their respective rights and to also enter into a high-level
settlement agreement further interpreting that contract language.”
Accordingly, the panel ordered the university to revoke its repudiation of the settlement
agreement.
B. Agency Fee
1. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, et al,
2010 NLRB LEXIS 319, 355 NLRB No. 174 (Aug. 27, 2010)
The National Labor Relations Board overturned an annual Beck objection requirement
under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), holding, however, that it
might reach a different conclusion under other circumstances.
In this case, several AFL-CIO affiliates had a process in place, pursuant to
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), by which non-member
objectors were required to renew their objections to union membership every year. The Supreme
Court held in Beck, as described by the Board, that objectors cannot be required to pay for
“activities unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.”
The Board observed that while this was the first time it had an opportunity to address
whether an annual renewal requirement was legitimate, it “[did] not . . . approach this question
with a blank slate.” The Board had previously held in California Saw v. Knife Works, 320
NLRB 224 (1995), that a union’s Beck objection procedures were to be analyzed under a dutyof-fair-representation standard, which involves balancing the interests of the collective
bargaining chapter as a whole in obtaining appropriate fees without undue cost or difficulty
against the interests of the objectors in easily objecting. As the Board described it, “this is
precisely the type of discretionary trade-off subject to the duty of fair representation.”
There are three ways for a union to violate its duty of fair representation: by acting
arbitrarily, by acting discriminatorily, or by acting in bad faith. The Board concluded here that
although the unions had acted arbitrarily, they had not acted discriminatorily or in bad faith.
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The unions had offered three rationales for the annual objection requirement: the unions
used it to get up-to-date addresses to send the required financial information to objectors; the
annual renewal requirement gave employees a chance to change their mind about objecting; and
other court decisions had approved of an annual objection requirement and there was no
guidance from the Board itself.
The Board concluded that none of those rationales was sufficient, at least in light of the
evidence provided by the unions. With respect to the addresses, the unions had agreed at trial
that they had other methods to get addresses for both members and nonmembers, including from
their local lodges and from employers. The Board signaled that under other facts, it might have
upheld the requirement:
The Unions advance no argument that suggests their administrative burdens or
costs are less under the Unions’ chosen method for insuring accurate addresses
than under available, alternative methods. Nor do the Unions assert that
significantly greater efficacy is achieved. These factors would be accorded
weight in our analysis if they were present and, in our view, would readily justify
the minimal burden imposed here. In their absence, however, the Unions have not
provided a rational explanation for choosing among admittedly available
alternatives.
In response to the unions’ argument about giving objectors an opportunity to change their
minds, the Board noted that they could do so whether or not there was an annual objection
requirement. And with respect to the previous supportive guidance, the Board noted that it came
from the Board’s General Counsel and other cases, but not from the Board itself, which has the
“primary responsibility to establish national labor policy.”
Finally, the Board concluded that the objection requirement was not discriminatory,
because there was no evidence of animus by the union, and the distinction between objectors and
nonobjectors was rational.
The Board closed by saying:
For the reasons we have explained above, we hold that, absent a more compelling
rationale or other procedures that minimize the burden of annual objection not
present in this case, a union violates its duty of fair representation if it declines to
honor nonmember employees’ express, written statement to the union that they
object on a continuing basis to supporting union activities not related to collective
bargaining and contract administration. If a union provides a written explanation
of the consequences of submitting a simple objection in contrast to a continuing
objection, the union does not violate its duty by honoring simple objections for
only 1 year. In addition, a union need not honor requests to object for periods of
time other than 1 year and continuously.
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The Board’s opinion therefore provides additional guidance to unions assessing how best
to establish an objection procedure: a union could require an objector to make either a year-long
objection or a continuing objection, but would not have to entertain, say, a request for a threeyear-long objection.
Because of the previous guidance suggesting that an annual objection requirement might
be reasonable, the Board’s order requiring the unions to permit objectors to lodge ongoing
objections was forward-looking only, not retroactive.
2. Knox v. California State Employees Association, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115 (9th
Cir. 2010)
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in a 2-1 opinion that a
union is not required to issue a second notice to agency fee payers when it adopts a temporary,
midterm fee increase, even if the fees are used in part for political activity.
Service Employees International Union Local 1000 (SEIU Local 1000), the bargaining
agent for California state employees, levied a special assessment to mount campaigns to defeat
two measures on a November 2005 ballot, but did not issue a second agency fee notice for the
year. Agency fee payers challenged the special assessment, arguing that it violated their First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution because it seized their
money for non-chargeable political expenses. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for
a preliminary injunction against the union, but ruled that the union must give 28,000 agency fee
payers a chance to ask for a refund on the special dues. The union appealed the district court’s
decision and the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision, holding that the union’s notice complied
with the procedural requirements for agency fee notices set out in Chicago Teachers Union v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
SEIU Local 1000 issues a Hudson notice to all non-members each June with an
explanation of the agency fee based on the union's expenditures for the most recent audited year.
The Hudson notice categorizes expenses as either “chargeable” or “non-chargeable” depending
on whether or not the expense relates to the union's representational functions. Non-members
may be charged for non-chargeable expenses; however, they have the option to object and be
charged a reduced agency fee based on the percentage of the union's total expenditures that can
be classified as chargeable.
The union’s 2005 Hudson notice explicitly stated that dues and fees were subject to
change without further notice to fee payers. The union approved a temporary assessment later
that year, effective September 2005, to fund a “Political Fight Back Fund.” The fund was to be
used for a “broad range of political expenses” in response to several anti-union measures on the
California special election ballot. The court found that although the union claimed the fund was
to be utilized for political action, “the assessment itself included no spending limitations and the
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money was actually used for a range of activities, both political and not, and both chargeable and
not.”
The Hudson standard of review calls for a balancing test to determine whether the agency
fee notice “prevents compulsory subsidization of ideological activity” on the part of objecting
employees “without restricting the union’s ability to require every employee to contribute to the
cost of collective bargaining activities.” Applying this balancing test, the Ninth Circuit held that
calculating the present year’s objector fee based on the prior year's total expenditures – rather
than predicting actual expenditures for the remainder of the year – is expressly permitted under
Hudson. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the assessment could not be
constitutionally collected from members because it was to be used for political purpose, noting
that the union had “already reduced the fee for objecting non-members” and had “demonstrated
that the assessment was not purely non-chargeable.”
Additionally, where the district court held that a union must issue a second Hudson notice
when it intends to “depart drastically from its typical spending regime and to focus on activities
that are political or ideological in nature,” the Ninth Circuit found such a system to be
“practically unworkable” because union spending “may vary substantially from year to year.”
The Ninth Circuit pointed to years in which a union may have higher chargeable costs because it
is negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. The appeals court held that “Hudson‘s
prior year method assumes and accepts that a union has no ‘typical spending regime,’ and that
even though spending might vary dramatically, a single annual notice based upon the prior year's
audited finances is constitutionally sufficient.”
C.

Salary Negotiations
1. Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges v. State College Education
Association, 787 N.W. 2d 246 (Neb. 2010)

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a public-sector faculty union’s offer on
proposed salary increases, which predicted increases on the basis of the AAUP’s salary survey,
and its proposal to treat all faculty categories the same.
The Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges bargained to impasse over salary
increases for the 2009-2011 contract year with the State College Education Association (SCEA),
the exclusive bargaining agent for professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and
instructors at the three Nebraska state colleges (Chadron State, Peru State, and Wayne State).
The SCEA based its final offer on a national array of public institutions, and it predicted
increases in future faculty salaries on the basis of the AAUP’s salary survey. The SCEA also
proposed across-the-board increases, with no distinctions among the various categories of
faculty. The Board of Trustees based its offer on a more regional array of colleges and
universities, and relied on Integrated Post-Secondary Data System (IPEDS) data. The Board of
Trustees also distinguished among the various categories of faculty and (not surprisingly)
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proposed much lower increases. Overall, the SCEA proposed a salary increase of about 11% and
the Board proposed an increase of about 4.33%.
The issue went to a Special Master, who disliked both offers (but had to choose one). He
did his own calculations and ultimately concluded that an increase of about 10% was needed to
maintain comparability during the contract period. Because that number was closer to the
SCEA’s final offer, and because faculty had typically all been treated uniformly, he ruled in
favor of the SCEA’s offer on both the proposed salary increases and the equal treatment of all
faculty categories. The Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), which is required to give
significant deference to the Special Master’s reasoning, upheld the Special Master’s decision,
and the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the CIR’s decision.
V. Discrimination and Affirmative Action
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions
1.

Fisher v. University of Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011)

In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the University of
Texas’ race-conscious admissions system. That system was instituted in 2004 following the
Supreme Court’s holding in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) that universities have a
compelling governmental interest in “obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body,” and that they may therefore consider race as a plus factor in order to enroll a
“critical mass” of minority students. In Grutter, the Supreme Court approved of the University
of Michigan Law School’s use of a “highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s
file, giving consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational
environment,” including race.
In this case, two Caucasian applicants who were denied admission to the University of
Texas at Austin (“UT” or the “University”) challenged the University’s admissions policies and
practices, claiming that they are discriminatory on the basis of race, and that UT violated their
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs
argued that UT’s admissions policy with respect to race is unrelated to the educational benefits
of a diverse student body that Grutter recognized, and that UT already has a critical mass of
minority students. The district court dismissed the claims, reaffirming the principles laid out in
Grutter. The district court noted that UT uses a holistic and individualized review of each
application, much like the University of Michigan Law School’s policy upheld in Grutter, and
concluded that UT does have a compelling state interest in achieving a diverse student body and
that the admissions program is narrowly tailored to reach that goal.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, relying heavily on the reasoning in
Grutter to assess the constitutionality of Texas’s admissions plan. The appeals court distilled
three educational objectives that the Grutter court believed were served by diversity in higher
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education: increased perspectives inside and outside the classroom, better preparation to act as
professionals, and increased civic engagement. Under Grutter, a university could seek to
increase diversity, but only through a holistic, flexible, and individualized program, not via the
use of quotas, separate admissions tracks, or a fixed set of points to minority applicants.
The Court observed that in the wake of Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996),
in which Fifth Circuit district court struck down UT law school’s use of race-based criteria in
admissions, minority applications plunged, and the following year the legislature implemented a
policy called the Top Ten Percent Law to enroll more underrepresented minority students. This
law allows Texas high school students in the top 10% of their high school classes to enter the
university without reference to standardized testing. The increase in minority enrollment after
passage of the Top Ten Percent Law reflected a tradeoff, however – namely, that because those
students could enter the university without relying on standardized testing, test scores for other
students became even more critical, with the result that African-American and Hispanic students
(who traditionally performed less well on standardized tests) below the top 10% of their class
were admitted in lower numbers while Caucasian students were admitted in higher numbers.
Soon after Grutter was decided, the university determined that minority students still had
low representation, and in 2004 it therefore added race as one of many factors that could be
considered in admissions decisions for applicants who weren’t automatically admitted via the
Top Ten Percent Law or their “Academic Index.” In addition, the university installed a formal
review process for its admissions procedures every five years (and it informally reviews the
procedures annually).
The Fifth Circuit agreed that UT has “a compelling interest in obtaining the educational
benefits of diversity,” and ruled that “UT has made an ‘educational judgment that such diversity
is essential to its educational mission,’ just as Michigan’s Law School did in Grutter.” The
Court indicated that “a university's educational judgment in developing diversity policies is due
deference.” The Court articulated two reasons to defer to “a university’s academic decisions”:
first, that the decisions are a product of “complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university,” and second, that “universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition,” with educational autonomy grounded in the First
Amendment.
The Court also rejected the appellants’ argument that the holistic admissions plan was
unnecessary in light of the Top Ten Percent Law. In fact, the Court criticized the Top Ten
Percent Law as potentially insufficient, suggesting that it “does not perform well in pursuit of the
diversity Grutter endorsed and is in many ways at war with it.” Evidently the minority students
admitted to the university remain clustered in certain programs, which a holistic review (but not
the Top Ten Percent Law) would allow the university to rectify. In addition, because the Top
Ten Percent effectively uses geographic diversity as a proxy for any other kind of diversity, “the
Top Ten Percent Law crowds out other types of diversity that would be considered under a
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Grutter-like plan . . . [and] restricts the University’s ability to achieve the maximum educational
benefits of a truly diverse student body.” The Court also invoked Justice Ginsburg’s observation
in Grutter that percentage plans like the Top Ten Percent Law “depend for their effectiveness on
continued racial segregation at the secondary school level,” “encourag[ing] parents to keep their
children in low-performing segregated schools, and discourag[ing] students from taking
challenging classes that might lower their grade point averages,” while creating a strong
incentive to avoid magnet schools and other competitive schools. The Court concluded that
“while the Top Ten Percent Law appears to succeed in its central purpose of increasing minority
enrollment, it comes at a high cost and is at best a blunt tool for securing the educational benefits
that diversity is intended to achieve.”
The court’s final approval of the Top Ten Percent program therefore came with a warning
that it was not blessing the race-conscious admissions system “in perpetuity.” As the court put it,
“it is more a process than a fixed structure that we review,” and the Top Ten Percent law risks
eventually appearing to incorporate a racial quota rather than an individual focus.
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
1. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010)
In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the Title VII claims of a group of Chicago
firefighter applicants to go forward. The plaintiffs were African-Americans who took the City of
Chicago’s firefighter exam in 1995. Based on the scores from this exam, the City created a list
dividing over 26,000 firefighter candidates into three categories: “not qualified,” “qualified,” and
“well qualified.” The City announced that it would only hire candidates from the “well
qualified” category, and it used the list at least 10 times over the next 5 years. White test-takers
were 5 times more likely to be identified as “well-qualified” than African-American test-takers;
as a result, 77% of the hired firefighters were white and only 9% were African-American.
Petitioners, African-American firefighters who were categorized as “qualified” and were not
hired, claimed that the City’s use of the list to hire firefighters had a disparate impact on AfricanAmericans in violation of Title VII.
Before bringing suit for employment discrimination, a Title VII plaintiff must file a claim
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred. The petitioners in Lewis filed their EEOC claim within
300 days of the first use of the list to hire candidates. The City of Chicago argued, however, that
the firefighters’ EEOC claim was untimely because it was filed more than 300 days after the
creation of the list.
In May 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the City’s use of the
list (not just its creation of the list) could be a discriminatory act under Title VII. The Court
distinguished between intentional discrimination and the disparate impact created by an
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apparently neutral policy. As the court explained, a plaintiff alleging that he or she has suffered
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII must demonstrate a “present violation”
within the 300-day limitations period. Where a plaintiff is alleging that he or she has
experienced intentional discrimination, then such deliberate discrimination within the 300-day
period must be shown. Where a plaintiff is claiming that a policy has had a disparate impact on
the basis of race, however, he or she need only point to evidence of the application of that policy
within the 300-day period.
The court acknowledged that either interpretation could produce “puzzling results” – that
its interpretation could make employers liable after many years of using a practice, and that the
opposite interpretation would allow employers to discriminate indefinitely if no claim were
brought within the period. The court believed that its conclusion was mandated by the language
of Title VII, however, and called on Congress to change the statute if it disagreed with the
outcome.
2. Gentry v. Jackson State University, 610 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D. Miss. 2009)
In this case, a federal district court in Mississippi applied the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
to uphold a professor’s discrimination claim, finding that a Title VII violation can occur each
time a discriminatory paycheck is issued.
In 2004, Dr. Laverne Gentry, a professor at Jackson State University (JSU), was denied
tenure and a corresponding pay raise. In 2006, she filed a discrimination claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that she was denied tenure because of
her gender. She later filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
alleging that the denial of tenure, and consequent lower pay, violated Title VII. She also claimed
that the university retaliated against her for filing the EEOC claim, a further violation of Title
VII.
JSU argued that Gentry’s Title VII claim was untimely and therefore invalid because she
had filed her EEOC claim 2 years after she was denied tenure; according to Title VII, a plaintiff
must file an EEOC claim within 180 days of a Title VII violation. Gentry argued, however, that
her claim was timely because the denial of tenure was a compensation decision under the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009 to overturn Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), in which the Supreme Court denied a Title
VII claim of unequal pay because the plaintiff had filed her EEOC claim more than 180 days
after the employer had adopted the discriminatory pay policy. The Act extends the time in which
a claim can be filed to 180 days after each discriminatory paycheck, not just 180 days after the
employer put the discriminatory pay structure in place. The court agreed with Gentry that her
denial of tenure counted as compensation discrimination for these purposes, and denied the
defendants’ summary judgment motion, thus allowing the case to proceed.
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JSU also sought summary judgment on the Gentry’s claim of gender discrimination on
the basis of pay disparity because it said Gentry was unable to identify male employees “nearly
identical” to her that were given the raise. The court refused to grant the university’s request,
citing factual disputes in the record that would have to be resolved later in trial. The court also
denied JSU summary judgment on Gentry’s retaliation claim, despite the fact that the Gentry did
include that allegation in her EEOC complaint, because it found the claim grew out of the earlier
charge of unequal pay, giving the court ancillary jurisdiction.
JSU appealed the district court’s decision to the Fifth Circuit; JSU eventually settled with
Gentry, however, and the appeal was dismissed.
3. Mezu v. Morgan State University, 367 Fed. Appx. 385 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed a professor’s
discrimination claim as untimely, holding that a pending internal appeal did not stop Title VII’s
statute of limitations from running.
Rose Ure Mezu, an African-American woman of Nigerian origin, began teaching at
Morgan State University (MSU) in 1993 as a non-tenure-track lecturer. By 1998 she had earned
a position as tenured associate professor, and in 2002 she applied for a promotion to full
professor. After she was denied the promotion, she filed a complaint with the EEOC – alleging
that the school had discriminated against her based on race and national origin, in violation of
Title VII – and then filed suit in federal court on the same grounds. The district court dismissed
her claim, however, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Mezu applied again for the position of full professor in 2004, but was again denied. In
2005, Mezu applied for a third time, and the Departmental Promotion Committee recommended
promoting her to full professorship. Her department chair recommended that she engage in
additional publishing, however, and recommended against promoting her. On April 6, 2006, the
MSU president informed her by letter that she would not be promoted, but informed her of her
right to appeal the decision.
Although she appealed the decision within a few days, MSU administrators took no
further action, and Mezu came to believe that they were not going to comply with MSU’s
published procedures on appointment, promotion and tenure. On March 25, 2007, Mezu filed
her second EEOC claim, and eventually sued again in federal court.
The district court dismissed Mezu’s claim as untimely, finding that she had filed her
EEOC claim beyond the statutory deadline of 300 days – a deadline that applies (instead of the
180-day deadline discussed above) if a plaintiff institutes actions in a state agency. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit agreed, finding that the president’s letter of April 6, 2006 triggered the 300day limitations period, “despite the pendency of her internal appeal with the University.”
Further, the court held that MSU’s “alleged failure to complete the internal appeal process did
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not constitute [an] independently discriminatory act[]” that would re-trigger or suspend the
running of the limitation period.
This decision suggests that professors who believe they have a federal or state
employment claim must watch the calendar very carefully to be sure they are not shut out of
court while waiting for the university’s processes to run.
4. Leibowitz v. Cornell University, 584 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 2009)
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a non-tenured
professor’s discrimination claim, holding that the non-renewal of a teaching contract could form
the basis of a Title VII claim even if the teacher was not tenured.
Peggy Leibowitz taught at the Ithaca campus of the New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations (ILR), a “contract college” of Cornell University that received funding
through the State University of New York (SUNY). ILR has two divisions: a Resident Division
for undergraduate and graduate students located in Ithaca, and an Extension Division for working
practitioners with regional offices throughout New York, including New York City and Long
Island.
Leibowitz began as an Extension Associate in the New York City office in 1983; in 1987,
after completing the Extension Division’s peer review process, she was promoted to the position
of Senior Extension Associate II. Although Senior Extension Associates were not tenured and
each appointment letter stated that their employment was “contingent upon funding,” Cornell
had never terminated, laid off, or failed to renew the contract of a Senior Extension Associate II
without cause. Leibowitz’s contract was renewed in 1992 and 1997. In 1998, she began
teaching a full class schedule for the Resident Division in Ithaca, as well as continuing to teach
and develop Extension programs. Between 2000 and 2003, Leibowitz won several teaching
accolades.
Because she was based in New York City, ILR reimbursed Leibowitz for her travel to
Ithaca. In 2001, though, a shift in Cornell policy changed the way ILR paid Leibowitz for travel,
and she told the dean that the new amount she was being given was not enough to cover her
costs. After several months of conversation between the dean and Leibowitz about travel
expenses, the dean and associate dean began to discuss whether it was financially wise to retain
her, given that the SUNY system had recently reduced the Extension Division’s budget.
In June 2002, Cornell and ILR informed Leibowitz that they would not be renewing her
contract due to fiscal reasons. Leibowitz initially planned to retire, but in December she asked to
take a position in the Long Island office, where the director was “eager” to hire her. Cornell
denied the request, citing “fiscal circumstances.” After the director of the Long Island office
wrote to Leibowitz to “confirm his offer to her” of a recently vacated position, Cornell informed
Leibowitz that the offer was not valid and fired the director for making it.
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Leibowitz filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
claiming, among other things, that Cornell’s non-renewal of her contract and its refusal to
consider her for the Long Island position were based on gender and age discrimination in
violation of Title VII.
After several earlier decisions by the district court and the Second Circuit, the Second
Circuit ruled in this decision that non-renewal of an employment contract when the individual is
seeking continued employment – regardless of tenure status – constitutes an “adverse action”
under Title VII. The court reasoned that the statute makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against a new applicant seeking employment, so it is equally unlawful to
discriminate against a current employee who is seeking continued employment.
The court of appeals also found that the district court erred in finding that the
circumstances did not give rise to an inference of age or gender discrimination. Leibowitz
presented evidence that during the relevant time period, defendants laid off five other employees,
all of whom were females over the age of fifty; reassigned Leibowitz’s duties to at least three
male instructors; and did not consider Leibowitz for any vacant positions and attempted to fill
one such position with a younger, male employee.
The court of appeals also rejected the district court’s reasoning that the defendants “had
proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the non-renewal” – namely, budgetary
concerns – and that Leibowitz had failed to show that justification was pretextual. There was
evidence that the budgetary concerns that existed in early 2002 diminished during the 2002-2003
school year and that the ILR hired twelve new employees during the relevant time period.
Combined with the evidence discussed above, this was enough to suggest that the defendants’
reason was pretextual and therefore enough for Leibowitz’s lawsuit to survive.
The appellate court sent the case back to the district court for trial; however, the jury
found for the ILR.
5. Kovacevich v. Vanderbilt University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36054 (M.D. Tenn.
Apr. 12, 2010)
In this case, a federal district court in Tennessee allowed a former graduate student’s
retaliation claim to go forward, finding that she had presented enough evidence to show that her
former thesis advisor’s criticism of her work may have been illegal retaliation under Title VII.
Brigitte Kovacevich was a graduate student at Vanderbilt University from 1997 to August
2006, seeking a doctorate in anthropology. Between 1999 and 2004, Kovacevich worked closely
with Dr. Arthur A. Demarest, her doctoral thesis advisor, and accompanied him to an
archeological excavation in Cancuen, about which she wrote her doctoral thesis. In 2004 or
2005, Kovacevich and other graduate students filed a complaint accusing Demarest of sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation; Kovacevich later filed a charge with the
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federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and sued in federal court alleging
violations of Title VII, Title IX and the Tennessee Human Rights Act.
During this time, Kovacevich and Demarest agreed that Demarest could continue to be
involved in her doctoral candidacy, as long as his comments and suggestions to her were
screened by others in the department. Demarest began to suggest that some of the assertions in
Kovacevich’s thesis were not supported by the most recent evidence at Cancuen (which she had
stopped visiting in 2004). However, in 2006 Kovacevich successfully defended her thesis and
was granted a doctorate. In January 2008, Kovacevich, Demarest, and the university settled her
harassment and retaliation claims with an agreement that included a non-disparagement clause
stating:
[D]efendants and their representatives… shall not publicly criticize, denigrate or
make disparaging remarks concerning [Kovacevich]… [but this section] shall not
restrict Plaintiff or Demarest from making reasonable, good faith, and professional
academic critiques or criticisms of the other’s research, interpretations, or published
work in the context of scientific and academic discourse and peer evaluation.
The agreement also provided that Vanderbilt itself would be liable for disparagement only
if “the alleged remarks can be shown to have been made with Vanderbilt’s advance knowledge
of, and express consent to, or knowing ratification of, such remarks.”
In March 2008, Kovacevich’s husband attended a lecture by Demarest, in which
Demarest disputed Kovacevich’s interpretations of the Cancuen findings. During the same
conference, Demarest complained to a Vanderbilt Press representative that Kovacevich did not
have permission to use certain illustrations in her chapter of a book Vanderbilt Press was
publishing. After Demarest again spoke unfavorably of Kovacevich’s interpretations at another
conference, Kovacevich filed a new charge with the EEOC against Vanderbilt, alleging that
Demarest’s remarks were illegal retaliation under Title VII. Kovacevich then filed suit in federal
district court, and Vanderbilt asked the court to grant it summary judgment and dismiss the
lawsuit.
Vanderbilt argued that Kovacevich was not protected by Title VII or the Tennessee
Human Rights Act because she was a graduate student, which was primarily an educational
rather than professional position. The university further argued that her complaints related solely
to her academic activities. While noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit –
the federal appeals court covering Tennessee, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio – has not ruled on
this topic and that some courts “have considered the dual role of graduate students,” the district
court side-stepped the question of whether a current graduate student would be protected by the
statute. Instead, the court held that dismissing the lawsuit because Kovacevich was no longer a
graduate student assistant at Vanderbilt in 2008, having received her Ph.D., would “undermine
the objectives” of Title VII.
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The court also rejected Vanderbilt’s argument that Kovacevich had not suffered a
“materially adverse” employment action. The court observed that an adverse action for Title VII
retaliation purposes might include “retaliatory conduct that does not relate to employment or
which occurred outside the Vanderbilt graduate student assistant workplace.” Kovacevich had
presented sufficient evidence that Demarest and Vanderbilt may have engaged in conduct “that
could well dissuade a reasonable Vanderbilt graduate student, TA, or research assistant from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination, such that the conduct would qualify as material
adverse action.”
The court therefore denied Vanderbilt’s motion for summary judgment and decided the
case should continue to be tried before a jury.
7. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011)
In this case, the Supreme Court held that when an employer fired the fiancé of an
employee who filed a sex discrimination charge against the employer, the employer had
unlawfully retaliated against the employee who filed the charge and the terminated employee
could therefore sue under Title VII.
Miriam Regalado and her fiancé Eric Thompson were both employed by North American
Stainless (NAS). Three weeks after NAS was notified by the EEOC that Regalado had filed a
sex discrimination charge against the company, NAS fired Thompson, who sued. After decisions
by the district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled in
Thompson’s favor, stating that NAS’s termination of Thompson violated Title VII. Under Title
VII, a range of retaliatory actions are prohibited – not just actions affecting the “terms and
conditions” of the employee who initially filed a charge with the EEOC, but also any action that
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination” (quoting Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006)). The court thought it was “obvious” that an employee might be discouraged from filing
a charge with the EEOC “if she knew that her fiancé would be fired.”
The court refused to identify “a fixed class of relationships” for which it would be
unlawful to fire one employee in retaliation for the protected activity of another; the court noted,
however, that “firing a close family member will almost always” meet the standard for a Title
VII retaliation claim, but “inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never
do so.”
Once the Court determined that NAS’s actions against Thompson violated Title VII, it
turned to the question of whether Thompson could actually sue. According to the Court, a
plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal statute can sue only if he “falls within the zone of
interests” that the statute is intended to protect. Under this test, a plaintiff cannot sue if his
interests “are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes” of the statute that it does
not appear that Congress, in passing the statute, intended to allow the plaintiff to sue.
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The Court applied the “zone of interests” test to Thompson’s claim and concluded that
because he was an employee and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their
employers’ unlawful actions, he “falls within the zone of interests protected by Title VII.”
Assuming that the facts as Thompson described them were accurate, he was not an “accidental
victim” of retaliation by NAS; instead NAS intended by terminating him to punish Regalado,
who had engaged in protected activity by filing the initial EEOC claim. Thompson was therefore
an “affected” person with standing to sue.
B. “Mixed Motive” Instructions and Discrimination Statutes
1. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009)
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a heightened standard of proof upon
employees who sue their employers for age discrimination.
Jack Gross sued his employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), alleging age discrimination after he was demoted and his former duties were assigned
to a younger employee whom he had previously supervised. During the trial, the judge read the
jury members a “mixed-motive” instruction, telling them that if Gross showed that his age was
one motivating factor in his demotion, the burden shifted to his employer to show that it would
have demoted him anyway, regardless of his age. This type of burden-shifting framework is
used in Title VII discrimination cases where a plaintiff has shown direct (as opposed to indirect
or circumstantial) evidence of discrimination. After the jury ruled in Gross’s favor, Gross’s
employer appealed on the grounds that the burden-shifting instruction should not have been
given because Gross had presented no direct evidence of discrimination.
Eventually the appeal reached the Supreme Court, which decided to tackle a broader
question: whether this burden-shifting framework should be used in ADEA cases at all
(regardless of whether the evidence of discrimination is direct or indirect). The court held that
this mixed-motive instruction – which originated in Title VII case law – was never appropriate in
ADEA cases because Title VII and ADEA are “materially different.” Congress had explicitly
amended Title VII to incorporate this burden-shifting framework, but it had failed to similarly
amend the ADEA. Because of this, and because of its analysis of the statute’s “plain language,”
the Court refused to apply prior Title VII precedents about burden-shifting to the ADEA. This
means that ADEA plaintiffs have a higher burden of persuasion than Title VII plaintiffs: instead
of proving that age was one motivation for an adverse employment decision, they must show that
age was the “but-for” or main cause of the decision.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gross is having an impact on a number of kinds of
cases, not just active ADEA cases. In January 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit – which covers Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana – applied the logic of Gross to an
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, holding that the “mixed motive” or “burdenshifting” framework of Title VII also does not apply in those cases. See Serwatka v. Rockwell
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Automation, Inc. 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that “when another anti-discrimination
statute lacks comparable language [to Title VII], a mixed-motive claim will not be viable under
that statute”).
VI. Miscellaneous
A. Subpoenas and Access to Faculty Research
1. Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli and the University of Virginia
In April 2010, the Attorney General of Virginia, Ken Cuccinelli, served a civil subpoena
on the University of Virginia (UVA). The subpoena sought e-mails and a variety of other
materials and documents relating to Michael Mann, a climate scientist who was a faculty
member at UVA until 2005, when he left for Pennsylvania State University (Penn State).
Professor Mann was one of the scientists involved in 2009’s “Climategate,” an episode at the
University of East Anglia in which a leaked e-mail from Mann referenced a “trick” he used to
create the “hockey stick” graph of global warming. Although some observers suggested that the
e-mails proved that global warming was essentially a hoax, investigations by the National
Academies of Science, Penn State, and an independent British review panel concluded that no
research misconduct had occurred, and that Mann’s reference was to statistical methods rather
than to fraudulent manipulations of the data.
Despite these conclusions, Attorney General Cuccinelli – who, a week before serving the
subpoena, filed suit challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s fuel standards on
the grounds that the East Anglia e-mails constituted “after-discovered evidence” regarding global
warming – apparently concluded that the actions reflected in Mann's e-mails might constitute
fraud under Virginia's Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (FATA). Accordingly, he served the
University of Virginia with an extremely broad subpoena that asked for Mann’s communications
with any of 39 other scientists, his communications with administrative assistants at UVA, and
all materials related to five grants for which he applied while at UVA.
After public pressure from the AAUP and other organizations, UVA filed a petition in
Virginia court to set aside the subpoena, invoking academic freedom concerns and arguing that
Cuccinelli’s subpoena does not satisfy the requirements of FATA. The AAUP and several other
groups filed an amicus brief in support of UVA’s petition, arguing that the requested items were
protected by the First Amendment and that the attorney general’s actions could seriously chill
academic freedom, university scholarship, and intellectual debate. The brief also argued that the
political controversy surrounding Professor Mann’s work did not rise to the level of fraud under
FATA (or federal law).
In late August 2010, the Virginia state court set aside the attorney’s general subpoena,
holding that Mann’s grants could be the subject of a request under FATA but that the attorney
general had failed to show any reason to believe that fraud had occurred and that the scope of
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any information request must be more limited. The decision did allow Cuccinelli to try again
with a more narrowly drawn subpoena, and in October 2010, Cuccinelli served another
information request on UVA.
Because Cuccinelli also appealed the judge’s decision, the university asked the court to
stay its decision on the follow-up subpoena pending the outcome of the appeal, which the
Virginia Supreme Court agreed in March 2011 to consider. The AAUP expects to file an amicus
brief with the Virginia Supreme Court in support of the university and the principles of academic
freedom and scientific inquiry.
2. Reyniak v. Barnstead International, 2010 NY Slip Op. 50689U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)
(unpublished)
In this case, a New York state trial court refused to enforce a subpoena that would have
forced a university to turn over a professor’s research notes and correspondence.
Kentile Floors, Inc., a company involved in asbestos litigation, served a subpoena on the
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine. Kentile claimed that the subpoena forced Mt. Sinai, which was
not a party to the litigation, to produce documents written by Dr. Irving Selikoff, a Mt. Sinai
faculty member who had performed research on the dangers of asbestos and asbestos exposure.
Kentile sought Dr. Selikoff’s private correspondence with asbestos manufacturers and his
unpublished research notes. Mt. Sinai claimed that this demand was overly broad and beyond
the language of the subpoena, and a New York state trial court agreed, finding that Kentile could
just as easily rely on Dr. Selikoff’s published materials. Furthermore, the court thought that
forcing Mt. Sinai to produce the materials “could well discourage other institutions from
conducting vital health and safety research,” both because of the costs involved in producing the
materials and because other scholars “may fear that their unpublished notes, observations and
ideas could be released to the public as a result of litigation.”
B. Medical Faculty and Malpractice Lawsuits
1. Schultz v. University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS
1694 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 2010)
In this case, an Ohio appeals court found that a medical professor could not be liable for
medical malpractice because performing surgery was part of his duties as a public employee.
Dr. Stewart Dunsker was a full professor of clinical neurosurgery at the University of
Cincinnati (UC) College of Medicine between 1984 and 2002, when he retired. He performed
surgery on James Schultz’s spine in 1997 at Christ Hospital, where Dunsker saw patients through
both the UC College of Medicine and his private practice group, the Mayfield Clinic. Schultz
sued Dunsker for medical malpractice in the Ohio Court of Claims in May 2008, claiming that
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the surgery had injured his laryngeal nerve and permanently affected his ability to speak in a
normal tone of voice.
Dunsker argued that he was immune from a malpractice lawsuit under Ohio state law
because while performing the surgery he was a state employee – that is, a professor at a public
university – acting within the scope of his professional duties. The Court of Claims agreed, as
did an Ohio Court of Appeals.
Ohio law states:
[N]o officer or employee shall be liable in any civil action that arises under the
law of this state for damage or injury caused in the performance of his duties,
unless the officer's or employee's actions were manifestly outside the scope of his
employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
The appellate court noted that the “dual nature of a physician’s employment as both
private practitioner and employee of a state medical institution has posed problems for courts,”
and that “in many instances, the line between these two roles is blurred.” Although in the past,
Ohio courts had focused on financial factors – such as the whether the medical practitioner or the
university made more money from the allegedly negligent treatment – the Ohio Supreme Court
recently rejected this approach in favor of “focus[ing] upon the purpose of the employment
relationship, not on the business or financial arrangements between the practitioner and the
state.” The appellate court determined that Dunsker was personally immune because a medical
resident was present during Schultz’s surgery. Because Dunsker testified that part of his duties
as a professor was to educate residents at the hospital, the court held that he was acting within
the scope of his employment duties when he operated on Schultz.
The appellate court also rejected Schultz’s other procedural and statute of limitations
arguments, and affirmed the lower court.
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